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CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM. By Milton Friedman. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1962. Pp. 202. $3.95.
Tnuis book is about liberal principles and their application to problems of
government control. The author, a prominent economic libertarian with strong-
ly held and dearly articulated convictions about both civil and economic lib-
erties, attempts in non-technical language to explain his principled convictions,
to expose their rationale, and then to apply them in evaluating public institu-
tions and governmental activities. His method consists in the uncompromising
application of general principles to particular cases. This is no book about what
to compromise for purposes of political expediency.
Friedman's critique is not reserved for new and controversial areas of public
control designed in the name of welfare. Longstanding and long-accepted pub-
lic institutions are subjected to his tests and found wanting. This is not a "con-
servative" book. The author is a "radical," albeit a philosophical radical. His
criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of public versus private decision-
making when applied to such institutions as public education, national parks
or the post office, will be radical to many a conservative. There are no sacred
cows for Friedman. The right-to-work laws fare no better than tie old age as-
sistance laws; the medical association gets the same kind of treatment as the
labor unions. With respect to tax reforms, compared to Professor Friedman,
President Kennedy is a piker! Eliminate the corporate income tax; tax in-
dividuals for withheld corporate earnings; treat capital gains as income; abolish
progression in income taxes above an exemption level; pay out, as an income
tax in reverse, to families with incomes below the exemption level; and use
the latter generously enough so as to eliminate other forms of welfare pay-
ments.
The scope of government, especially central government, has vastly over-
expanded into areas more appropriately left to the competitive market place.
Friedman does not contend that the market is always reliable. It is a question
of assessing the alternatives. What should belong in the public sector and what
should belong in the private sector depends principally upon whether the activ-
ities are market supporting or market supplanting, whether they promote or
impede freedom, and whether or not freedom of action competes with or com-
plements other recognized objectives. The conclusion is that a great deal more
freedom is both desirable and feasible.
The opposite of freedom is coercion. Coercion is a central problen for Fried-
man. Political coercion is no less important than economic coercion. Coercion
can be public or private; it can be imposed by majorities as well as minorities;
and it can have equally dire results when applied soulfully as when applied
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with diabolical intent. Friedman, of course, recognizes the need for govern-
mental coercive power. He is no anarchist. The power of government is re-
quired not only to preserve freedom but to accomplish other objectives not
attainable through voluntary private action. This is not to minimize the very
serious threat the author sees in concentrating power-for him unnecessary
power-in political hands.
Friedman urges primary reliance on voluntary cooperation and private enter-
prise in both political and other activities, not solely to achieve such economic
ends as efficient organization of production and effective remuneration for pro-
ductive contribution, although these are important. Equally important is civil
liberty: "the private sector is a check on the powers of the governmental sector
and an effective protection of freedom of speech, religion and thought."' Pri-
macy is placed on the integrity of imperfect individuals and their right to make
their own decisions and their own mistakes. Although ethical goals are not
explicitly discussed, the very uncertainty of ultimate ethical goals, as Milton
Friedman's friend George Stigler has observed, "... dictate(s) a wide area of
individual self-determination."
2
Freedom is foremost among Friedman's values not only because he deems
it cardinal, but also because he finds freedom to be much more compatible with
other objectives than is usually assumed. Self-determination is not everything,
The author's strong opposition to such governmental undertakings as public
housing, minimum wage statutes, farm price supports, medical care for par-
ticular groups, as well as his opposition to right-to-work laws, does not derive
from intellectual myopia or from disdain for humanitarian sentiment. Neither
does it derive from crassness towards, or lack of interest in, problems of pover-
ty. In fact, a prescription for the alleviation of poverty is a welfare alternative
which Friedman suggests as a substitute for the special "market displacing"
institutions of which he is so critical. The author's position is that many, if not
most, of the current means of aiding the "under-privileged" involve disguised
judgments of their personal incompetence. Friedman believes them to be more
capable than the government in making choices about their own needs, although
the freedom of families not to educate their children is a notable exception.
Solving economic problems through a price system is the essence of capital-
ism. The Friedman position is that the market is a vastly underrated institu-
tion. Dollar voting, given adequate monetary and fiscal policy, and a provision
for reasonable balloting by the otherwise dollarless, is the central prerequisite
of his prescription.
Basically, there are two classes of cases which should call for government
action-that is to say, two classes in which private competitive action (under
conditions of voluntary exchange) is either impossible or at least too costly to
be tolerated. The two general classes calling for exception are (1) technical
monopoly, and (2) neighborhood effects.
1. FRIEDMAN, p. 3.
2. STIGLER, FivF LECTURES ON EcoNoMIc PROBLEMS p. 8 (1950).
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The first category, technical monopoly, is strictly limited. Included in it are
a narrowly proscribed group of activities the market for which is of such size
as to support only single enterprises. Here costs decrease over such wide ranges
of output that the competitive process, if allowed to operate, would drive out
all but the single seller and leave the market susceptible to private exploitation.
But government operation or regulation, even here, may create almost as many
problems as it solves. Consequently the exception is limited to such extreme
cases as local telephone companies or water works. For other cases the market
should be allowed to work (or made to work by antitrust remedy) as best it
can.
The second category of exceptions, involving neighborhood effects, is more
difficult to delineate. Friedman indicates the nature of the problem by a water
pollution example and again in a chapter dealing with public education. Both
examples show how difficult the evaluative problem is, as will be evidenced in
the subsequent resum6 of the role of public education. In part this arises from
the fact that there seems to be at least a little "neighborhood effect" in every-
thing that is done in society.
Neighborhood effects giving rise to problems of public control involve im-
position of substantial effect on others in situations in which the producer of
these effects neither bears their costs nor gets the reward for their advantages.
Friedman's reference to the pollution of a stream as an example of a neigh-
borhood effect is: "The man who pollutes the stream is in effect forcing others
to exchange good water for bad. These others might be willing to make the
exchange at a price. But it is not feasible for them acting individually to make
the exchange or to enforce appropriate compensation." 3 In this example a
large number of people are involved. Therefore the costs of handling the prob-
lem through the market or the firm are presumably high. The central social
problem, whether resolved by the market or not, is whether the value of the
firm's product which is added by the pollution-creating activity is greater than
the value of the loss to all of those affected by the pollution. That the market
may be a very costly instrument for resolving this problem is not cause for
governmental intervention unless such intervention can be expected to allocate
the resources at a cost which is not only less than the cost of using the market,
but also less than the cost of the harmful effects of doing nothing. Friedman
stresses the fallibility and costliness of government administration which oper-
ates under political pressures, without any competitive checks. But where to
draw the boundary line between private and government regulation remains
elusive. As Friedman says:
Our principles offer no hard and fast line.., we must draw up a balance
sheet listing advantages and disadvantages. Our principles tell us what
items to put on one side and what items on the other and they give us
some basis for attaching importance to the different items.4
3. FRa=A, p. 30.
4. FmnuA i, p. 32.
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Much of the material contained in this book has been presented previously
in different forms to rather widely divergent audiences. The reworking of this
material into its present structure for popular consumption was done in such
fashion as to leave many of the chapters available as useful independent essays
on particular topics. This is true of the middle chapters concerning monetary
policy, international trade and fiscal policy, as well as the chapter concerning
public education and the one on capitalism and discrimination.
Chapter I, The Relation betveen Economic Freedom and Political Freedom,
attempts to dispel the generally held belief that the two concepts are separate
and largely unconnected. The author views economic liberty as a precondition
of effective civil liberty. Appeal to the Fifth Amendment, for example, "would
have been a hollow mockery without an alternative to government employ-
ment." And, "It is of interest to note that a disproportionately large fraction of
the people involved [in our experience with McCarthyism] ... went into the
most competitive sectors of the economy-small business, trade, farming -
where the market approaches most clearly the ideal free market."5
Chapter II, The Role of Government in a Free Society, stresses the need for
rules, proportional representation, prohibition of the coercion of individuals,
widespread reliance on the market, enforcement of property rights, protection
against enemies, and the provision of a monetary framework.
Chapters III, IV, and V, The Control of Money, International Trade
Arrangements, and Fiscal Policy deal with material upon which Friedman has
worked as a professional economist over a number of years and concerning
which he has made distinguished contributions. They summarize in very useful
fashion (although not always easy going for non-economist readers) the results
of research by him and his associates over a long period. Moreover, Friedman
has presented these materials in such fashion that there need be no doubt about
the consistency of this work with his broader conclusions on capitalism and
freedom. Here is a challenging and useful summary for the special as well as
the general reader.
Chapter VI, The Role of Government in Education, provides substantial
contrast to the preceding chapters. Here and in the following Chapter VII,
Capitalism and Discrimination, is writing which will remind many of a Fried-
man lecture or a Friedman conversation: brashly challenging, insistently prob-
ing, purposely shocking, but always relevant.
Friedman's discussion of public education, as has been indicated, is cast in
terms of an analysis of what he calls the neighborhood effect. Since this effect
is the principal area of exception to Friedman's "market principle" some detail
may be in order. The gains derived from education (or the losses from the lack
of education) do not accrue only to the student or his family; education confers
benefits of a substantial sort on society. Stated differently, lack of education is
a social cost. Moreover, here, even more obviously than in the previously men-
tioned stream-pollution example, the other individuals affected are so numerous
5. FRIEDMAN, p. 21.
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and widely scattered that the market mechanism does not provide a means of
cost allocation. Consequently some form of government action is recognized as
being appropriate. Friedman suggests that having the government as the pre-
dominant operator of schools is only one solution to the problem posed and not
necessarily the best. He finds government subsidy more justifiable than govern-
ment operation.
The social cost of too little education forces the author to call for coercion.
Mere provision against poverty is not sufficient. Parents have to be compelled
to provide at least minimum general education for their children, not only be-
cause of the interests of the children, but because:
A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum degree
of literacy and knowledge on the part of most of the citizens and without
widespread acceptance of a common set of values.0
In assessing the relative advantages of government-operated schools and
private schools, Friedman places greater emphasis on the means of appraisal
than upon the "correctness" of his own conclusion. He stresses the distinction
between education and schooling; he suggests that neighborhood effects are
likely to be greater for lower than for higher education; and he warns against
appraising technical or professional education as general education for citizen-
ship.
The conclusion is that there should be much wider opportunity and support
for private education. Friedman believes that public education at the primary
and secondary level may be justified, and that one way to find out is to prescribe
minimum standards (licensing) for private schools in order to see if families
prefer them. Those preferring private schooling would be reimbursed for the
estimated cost of comparable public education. It is recognized that there are
disadvantages as well as advantages in this recommendation. Cost considera-
tions involved in providing alternative forms of schooling may be very high in
sparsely settled areas (technical monopoly); of more general relevance, the
reasonableness of the minimum standards provided for acceptable private edu-
cation, as well as the cost of providing it, deserves careful consideration.
Among the advantages Friedman notes to support private schooling are:
provision for wider choice to meet individual preferences, a competitive stimu-
lus for a better product, remuneration for teaching more closely related to
teaching accomplishment, allocation of non-educational schooling costs (such
as basketweaving) to those who are willing to pay for them, and, not least im-
portant, provision for a voluntary desegregation of neighborhood classes in
schools without relocation of families. Under the author's analysis, these ad-
vantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages for primary and secondary edu-
cation, especially in urban centers. For higher education, and for technical and
professional education, his case for private over public education is clearly
much stronger.
6. F=Dimnw, p. 86.
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Monopoly and Social Responsibility is Chapter VIII. As to monopoly prob-
lems, Friedman says that he is lacking special or technical competence and that
consequently ". . this chapter is limited to a fairly cursory survey of some of
the broader issues: the extent of monopoly, the sources of monopoly, the ap-
propriate government policy, and the social responsibility of business and
labor." 7 He then proceeds in the course of fifteen short pages to present the
essence of the monopoly problem in so cogent a manner as to make his dis-
claimer seem disingenuous. At least it is more applicable to 98 per cent of the
"experts" in the field than it is to Friedman. When one is as competent
a theorist as is this author, especially when such capable students of monopoly
as Stigler and Director are close colleagues, disclaimers may safely be ignored.
Occuptional Licensure, Chapter IX, deals with problems which parallel those
involved in the medieval guilds. The examples in this section lean heavily on
the work of Reuben Kessel and that of Walter Gellhorn. Their materials pro-
vide interesting examples for the application of Friedman's "market principle."
Considerable attention is given to the American Medical Association and the
restraining effects this association exerts on entry into the profession. A com-
parative review of how well the medical problem is actually handled under
Britain's public health system would have provided an interesting contrast, not
only to the American system as it exists, but also to Friedman's speculations
about the usefulness of medical teams operating through clinics. For example,
are tolerance, diversity, experimentation, as well as the rationing of scarce
medical skills deteriorating in Britain? The author's thesis would seem to fore-
cast such a result.
The last three chapters of the book prior to the conclusion deal with distri-
bution of income, social welfare measures, and the alleviation of poverty. These
"welfare" chapters involve problems where a balancing process is required.
Inevitably, as he makes clear, this sort of task reflects the author's preferences
because recognized goals of governmental action such as revenue, incentives for
productive effort, efficient allocation of productive resources, and provision
against poverty may be conflicting. In Friedman's prescription, provision
against poverty financed by tax reform makes undesirable such social welfare
measures as public housing, farm supports and old age survivors insurance.
As must be eminently clear, this little book covers a wide range of problems.
Although the exposition is uneven-different chapters seem appropriate for
different readers-the work is uniformly challenging. There is material here
which is reminiscent of Hayek's Road to Serfdom, or Simons' Economic Policy
for a Free Society. Capitalismn and Freedom complements the work in that
tradition. The author's convictions have been described as strong. But they are
never disguised, nor are they diluted to make them palatable. The tone of the
work is perhaps somewhat evangelical. What of that? There is scarcely cause
for alarm in this day and age from a plethora of total-immersion libertarians.
WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.t
7. FR-E MAN, p. 121.
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